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INTERPRETING WORDS IN A PATENT
Douglas Y’Barbo*
Introduction
The unquestionable center of gravity of a patent infringement suit is the meaning
of selected words in the patent claim. The process that a court applies to decide the
meaning of disputed language; whether it ought to consider evidence outside the patent
record; and if it does, whether factual findings made from that evidence are entitled to
deference on appeal are the three tightly reticulated questions that comprise the claim
construction debate. They are also the most frequently debated and most pressing
questions in patent law. This Article is directed to a single model to resolve the debate
over these three chronic problems.
I. An Informal Taxonomy of Claim Construction Disputes
The interpretive model presented in this article is premised upon empirical
observation, i.e., by observing how claim construction is actually performed by the
Federal Circuit. This examination reveals that claim construction proceeds through
selection by the trial judge or Federal Circuit panel using one of two constructions
presented by the parties: one proffered by the patent owner and one by the accused
infringer. In other words, claim construction--judicial rhetoric notwithstanding--is not an
unconstrained search of the disputed term’s meaning, but instead a more ordinary process
of selection from among two alternatives. This selection is made between two proffered
interpretations for the disputed claim language. The author suggests that one way to
understand claim construction is to understand precisely how these two proffered
interpretations compare to one another, and how the interpretations compare to a single
agreed-upon benchmark (the term’s fixed meaning).
Empirical observation aside (i.e. what courts actually do), this process of
construction is the most sensible. The essential question under which all others are
subsumed is whether the accused device lays within the scope of the patent owner’s
property right. For the purposes of analysis, this question is ordinarily divisible into *192
two smaller questions: (1) what is the scope of the property right?; and (2) does the
accused device lay within it? The scope of the property right is determined from the
patent’s claims, which are mainly expressed in words and their meanings. Empirically
speaking, only a few words, sometimes just one, are in dispute. Therefore, determining
the scope of the property right--the first step in the infringement question--is actually a
*
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matter of interpreting a few words (i.e. the disputed claim terms). The trial court
identifies the disputed claim term or terms, then requires the two parties to offer their
respective constructions of that term. Naturally, the accused infringer will urge a
construction of the disputed term that places the accused device outside the justdetermined scope, and not surprisingly this proffered construction is as broad as possible
yet just barely avoids the accused device. Of course, the patent owner will urge a
construction that places the accused device within the scope. Yet while the patent owner
wishes to urge a construction that captures the accused device, he is careful not to offer a
proposed construction that is so broad that the recently construed claims are judged
invalid.1 Hence, the process of proffering an interpretation of the disputed claim’s term
has a strong self-policing character to it. The trial court decides infringement by
construing the patent claims. The court can certainly refuse to select one of the two
proffered constructions and create its own, but there is no point in doing so because
whatever that construction is, it will either capture the accused device or release it.
At the end of the day, the accused device either infringes or it does not. The trial
court’s only task is to answer that binary question; it cannot, regardless of what it does,
supplement that result. There is no point in seeking a finer distinction that the end result
permits. Therefore, claim construction should not be an unbounded search for the
disputed term’s meaning but instead a rational process of selection from between the two
proffered alternatives.
What follows is a discussion of three distinct lines of cases. Each line of authority
has emerged in response to the directives of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., and
each is by now securely installed in the Federal Circuit’s claim construction
jurisprudence. 2 As we shall see, step-wise application of the principle embodied in each
line actually defines post-Markman claim construction.
*193 II. The Markman Model
A. What is Claim Construction?
In Modine Mfg. v. United States International Trade Commission, a case decided
shortly after Markman, the disputed claim term was “flat side walls” in a patent directed
to a refrigerant condenser used in automotive air conditioners.3 Because the accused
device had fin-like projections on the interior walls of its condensor (to increase the
1

Claims are held invalid for numerous reasons. The particular reasons with which
we are concerned with in this case are when the claims read on prior art or when the
claims are not enabled by the specification.
2

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (1995).
3

Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1550, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1611 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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surface area, thus providing additional condensation), the accused infringer argued that
“flat side walls” meant that the interior walls of the condenser are smooth or without fins
or webbing.4 The patent owner, Modine, argued that the “flat side walls” referred to the
cross-sectional exterior shape of the condenser tubes; thus, it meant that the tubes in
cross-section are not circular but oval.5
The disputed claim language appears this way in the claim: “[w]eb means within
said flat cross-section tubes and extending between and joined to the flat side walls ....”6
The claim not only allows interior web fin-like projections but it requires them.
According to the accused infringer, “flat” means without web means; but “web means”
and “flat” are both required elements of the claimed condenser.7 If the accused infringer
were correct that “flat side walls” meant that the interior walls were without web means,
then the claim is internally inconsistent. Because a patented device cannot both have an
element and not have it at the same time, the accused infringer’s proffered construction
produced a linguistically implausible reading of the claims. Therefore, construction of the
disputed claim term was resolved entirely by eliminating one of the two proffered
constructions by identifying the one that produced an implausible reading of the text. In
other words, the dispute in Modine was soluble solely from the claims themselves
without the need for extrinsic evidence.
*194 Now compare Modine with Markman. The patent in Markman was directed
to a system for tracking various items in a retail dry cleaning operation to prevent loss
and theft.8 The disputed claim term was “inventory.”9 The patent owner, Markman,
argued that it could refer to either cash or clothes, as well as cash and clothes together.10
The trial court quickly discarded this construction since it rendered the claim limitation
internally incoherent: “[w]hereby said system can detect and localize spurious additions
to inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom.” 11 The trial court reasoned that if the
term “inventory” could refer to cash only, then this limitation rendered the entire claim
incoherent.12 The reason is that cash is not “localized” since it does not travel through the
4

Id. at 1550, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611.

5

Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611.

6

Id. at 1549, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611 (emphasis added).

7

Id. at 1550, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611-12.

8

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1995).
9

Id. at 974, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325.

10

Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325.

11

Id. at 982, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331.
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dry cleaning system. 13 Also, cash is not reasonably subject to “spurious additions” to the
system.14 The Court concluded that the term “inventory” cannot mean just “cash.”15
In Markman, just like in Modine, the claim construction dispute was resolved not
by a quixotic search for the term’s true meaning, but instead by a pragmatic yet
systematic process of eliminating the linguistically implausible interpretation from
among the two proffered constructions. Not once did the Federal Circuit in Markman or
Modine even hint at what was the “true meaning” of the term “flat side walls” or
“inventory.” Again, the accused infringer argued that “inventory” must refer to at least
clothes (e.g., either clothes or clothes and cash).16 The patent owner argued that it could
refer to just cash. 17 The Markman Court resolved the dispute not by asking what the term
actually meant, but instead by checking each of the two proffered conjectures against the
text and eliminating the one that fails to preserve the text’s internal coherence. Thus the
Markman Court *195 never once actually said what “inventory” meant, though it did say,
that whatever it meant, it could not refer to just cash.18
First, notice that the Markman and Modine panels did not assign meaning to the
disputed claim language. Instead each produced its construction by selecting one from
among the two constructions proffered by the parties, and more particularly, by
eliminating the least plausible one. Indeed, almost without exception, the Federal Circuit
performs the process of claim construction not by creating or determining the meaning of
the claims. Instead what the Court does, if one looks closely enough, is select one of the
two constructions proffered by the parties; often by eliminating the least plausible

12

Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331.

13

Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331.

14

Markman, 52 F.3d at 971, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331.

15

Id. at 988-89, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337.

16

Id. at 974, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325.

17

Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325.

18

Sometimes Federal Circuit opinions recite the “meaning” of the claim in these
terms (i.e., by what the scope does not include). For example, “[t]he word ‘passage’ in
the asserted claims, properly construed, does not encompass a completely cylindrical,
smooth-walled structure.” O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co. Inc., 115 F.3d 1576, 1581, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1777, 1781 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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alternative.1920 This is an empirically demonstrable proposition. The Federal Circuit or its
predecessor court has rejected both parties’ proffered constructions and decreed its own
claim construction a grand total of three times in the past twenty years. 21 The majority
opinion in each case was authored by the same judge, Judge Clevenger. Moreover, two of
these cases in particular, Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corporation and J.T.
Eaton v. Atlantic Paste Glue Company, were harshly criticized, both by the dissenting
judges and by the patent *196 bar.22 Both cases were criticized not only for de novo
construction but also for the particular construction the court chose.23

19

That is why one often sees Federal Circuit judges state in dictum that claim
construction is generally dispositive of the infringement analysis. Of course it’s
dispositive. The patent owner proffers a construction of the disputed claim term that, if
selected, would place the accused device within the claim scope; and the accused
infringer proffers a construction that, if selected, would place the accused device outside
the claim scope.
20

Also, claim construction is really not a process of determining the scope of the
claims. Instead, it is a matter of interpreting one or more (often just one) disputed words
or terms within the claim: As with many patent cases, at issue is the meaning of only a
few words in the claims--sometimes just a single word, rarely more than three or four.”
See, e.g., Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1418
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
21

See, J.T. Eaton v. Atlantic Paste Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996); and Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995). These are all Clevenger opinions.
Thus, while Judge Clevenger has failed to grasp the Federal Circuit’s established practice
of claim construction, consider how he tentatively followed the Markman approach (only
to ignore it later): “Therefore, in our view, the plain meaning of the claim will not bear a
reading that ‘pusher assembly’ and ‘pusher bar’ are synonymous.” Ethicon, 93 F.3d at
1579, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1024. He should have stopped right there but he didn’t. In the
very next sentence he said this: “The question remains, though, what is the meaning of
the term ‘pusher assembly’?” Id.
22

See, e.g., Kelly Ann Casey, Recent Developments: Exxon Chemical Patents v.
Lubrizol Corp.: The Federal Circuit Sets Unreasonable Standards for Chemical
Composition Inventions, 31 GA. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (1997); A Statutory Solution to the
Mischiefs of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 279, 308
(1997).
23

Casey, Recent Developments, 31 GA. L. REV. at 1228; Note, A Statutory
Solution, 63 Brooklyn L. Rev. at 308.
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Second, Markman’s core proposition is that “[a] term can be defined only in a
way that comports with the instrument as a whole”. 24 The opinion reiterated more
precisely that it required that the proposed definition fully complies with the specification
and claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal coherence. This is a sophisticated
interpretive model and a challenging directive to execute. But how can we tell whether a
particular construction of a disputed claim term preserves the patent’s internal coherence?
In fact, it’s difficult to do since it requires reading the entire text and having a thorough
understanding of the complex relationship between the invention’s primary elements.
However, what is much easier is to tell is whether a particular construction does not
preserve the text’s internal coherence.25 Thus, if one conjecture is checked against the
text and it renders two portions of the text incoherent or in conflict with one another, then
this conjecture must be discarded. Hence, “internal textual coherence” is a reasonably
objective baseline indeed as evidenced by Modine and Markman. As we shall see, the
Federal Circuit has relied upon this baseline to decide a number of post-Markman
disputes, and from these decisions a rule has coalesced.
Markman and Modine stand for the proposition that claim construction is not a
process of assigning meaning to each of the terms in a claim, rather it is a process of
systematically eliminating implausible interpretations (i.e. textual not technical
implausibility). The linguistic competence needed to do this is not high. For instance,
consider the statements “all cocker spaniels are dogs,” “Cujo is not a dog,” and “Cujo is a
cocker spaniel.” If one can tell that if the first two statements are correct then the third is
not. Thus, the third statement renders the “text” (the sum of the three statements)
incoherent. Notice that one can make this claim about the implausibility of statement
number three, even if they have never seen a cocker spaniel nor ever met Cujo. Similarly,
one could confirm that the accused infringer’s proffered construction in Modine was
implausible without any knowledge of condenser technology.
*197 B. Other Cases That Apply the Markman Model
Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronics, Inc. is a virtually identical dispute.26
Despite almost unanimous criticism from the patent bar, this case is correctly decided
beyond a shadow of a doubt. In Vitronics, the disputed claim term was “solder reflow
temperature.”27 Unfortunately, this term was not used anywhere in the specification.28

24

Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1391, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1470 (citations omitted).

25

Id., 38 U.S.P.Q. at 1470.

26

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
27

Id. at 1579, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.

28

Id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.
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The first time it appears is in the claims. 29 Two other terms were in fact mentioned in the
specification: “liquidus temperature” and “peak reflow temperature.”30 So the question
was which of these two terms was synonymous with the disputed claim term. The
plaintiff, Vitronics, argued that the disputed claim term, “solder reflow temperature,”
referred to “peak reflow temperature.”31 The accused infringer, Conceptronics, argued
that the disputed claim term referred to “liquidus temperature.”32
Two different temperatures are relevant in soldering technology as it relates to the
Vitronics patent.33 The first is the temperature at which the solder first begins to melt and
freely flow (the liquidus temperature).34 The second important temperature is the one in
which the solder re-flows after first melting, obviously a higher temperature than the first
(the peak reflow temperature).35 In the Vitronics specification, three exemplary types of
solder are described each having a liquidus *198 temperature of 190° C and a peak
reflow temperature of about 210-218° C. 36 With that background in mind, here is that
crucial claim language: “A method for reflow soldering ... for a period of time sufficient
to cause said solder to reflow and solder said devices to said board while maintaining the
temperature of said device below said solder reflow temperature.”37 Thus, Claim 1 recites
a process of soldering “[w]hile maintaining the temperature below said solder reflow
temperature.”38 Again, whether the claim term “solder reflow temperature” refers to

29

Generally, the Federal Circuit decisions and the scholarly commentary use the
term “specification” to refer to the entire patent document minus the claims. Thus, in
common vernacular, the patent document consists of the specification and the claims. In
fact, the claims are part of the specification according to the Patent Code (35 U.S.C. §
112 ¶ 1 (1988)). I shall use the terms “specification” and “claims” consistent with their
common usage, rather than in the formal sense.
30

Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.

31

Id.

32

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.

33

Id. at 1579-80, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.

34

Id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.

35

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1579-80, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1573, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
36

Id. at 1580 n.3, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574 n.3.

37

Id. at 1579, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.

38

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.
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“liquidus temperature” or to “peak reflow temperature” is the issue on appeal. 39
If the disputed claim term refers to “liquidus temperature” (as defined in the
specification) then the claim language just recited makes no sense. One cannot solder
below the liquidus temperature; by definition, that is the temperature at which the solder
first begins to melt.40 Thus, below the liquidus temperature soldering cannot occur. On
the other hand, if the disputed claim term referred to the peak reflow temperature then
this portion of the claim is at least sensible or not internally incoherent. So Vitronics, just
like Markman and Modine, is an extraordinarily easy dispute to resolve, one of the two
proffered constructions renders the claim incoherent and therefore must be rejected.41
Also just like Markman, the Vitronics Court never bothered to find the correct meaning
of the disputed claim term. Instead, all it did was determine that it could not mean
“liquidus temperature,” but that it could plausibly refer to “peak reflow temperature.”
In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit vacated the trial court’s construction of the
claims, 42 and in both Markman and Vitronics, the trial courts relied upon extrinsic
evidence. Yet on appeal, the Federal Circuit did not look at the extrinsic evidence, but
instead produced its construction based solely upon the intrinsic record. More to the
point: the case did not involve a re-reading of the extrinsic record. Therefore, according
to the Vitronics court, deference is not owed to those factual findings because any factual
findings produced were illegitimate (i.e., they were not *199 necessary to resolve the
dispute, as evidenced by the fact that the panels did not consider them in reaching a
contrary construction). So one must not confuse cases of this sort with those like Bausch
& Lomb Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve Inc..43 There the Federal Circuit (preMarkman), like Vitronics, set aside the trial court’s claim construction and developed its
own, but unlike Vitronics, based its construction, at least in part, upon the re-reading of
the extrinsic record.
C. A Brief Digression: The Proper Standard of Review

39

Id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1575.

40

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574.

41

And yet despite this simplicity, Vitronics was decided after a lengthy trial
followed by an appeal. This case should illustrate, as well as any, that nearly any dispute
no matter how simple, can be made much more complex once extrinsic evidence-particularly expert testimony--is admitted.
42

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1586, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
43

Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 230
U.S.P.Q. 416 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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If this view is correct, then it offers a solution to the debate over the proper
standard of review in claim construction disputes. The Markman and Cybor Corporation
v. FAS Technologies, Inc. courts--both en banc decisions--have decreed that the standard
of review is de novo. Yet the debate over the deference owed to factual findings made at
the trial level continues as evidenced by cases like Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates,
Inc. and Eastman Kodak v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, and even more recently,
two post-Cybor cases, Voice Technologies and Key Pharmaceuticals. 44
In fact, many standards of review in U.S. law, including patent law, are de novo.45
Yet underlying facts are still assessed under a more discretionary standard; hence most de
novo standards are actually a hybrid or layered standard. 46 Markman *200 and Vitronics
are perfectly consistent with this background rule. In these two cases, the extrinsic
evidence was not reviewed under any standard, since the Federal Circuit made an a priori
determination that the lower court should not have relied upon extrinsic evidence at all. If
it had decided that extrinsic evidence was properly received during trial, then deference is
owed to those factual findings. 47 This plenary authority to assign the dispute to one
category or another (i.e., to determine whether extrinsic evidence is necessary or not)
defines de novo review in claim construction disputes. This view accounts for the desire
to defer to trial courts on factual findings, which are beyond question the more
experienced and structurally far better situated forum to conduct factual inquiries, while
at the same time ensuring that trial courts do not slowly but insidiously short circuit
appellate review by re-labeling then subsuming the entire dispute under the rubric of
“factual determinations.”

44

Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Eastman Kodak v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Voice Technologies Group, Inc. v. VC Systems, Inc.,
164 F.3d 605, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Key Pharmaceuticals v. Hercon
Laboratories, Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
45

For instance, the obviousness determination under section 103 of the Patent
Code”[i]s a question of law that this court reviews de novo ....” In re Donaldson
Company, Inc. 16 F.3d 1189, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), as is the
enablement standard under § 112, ¶ 1 “Although the question of whether [a party’s
foreign priority] specification contains a sufficient disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1
is one of law, ... compliance with the written description aspect of that requirement is a
question of fact.” Utter v. Hiranga, 845 F.2d 993, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1709 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
46

See, Fromson, 132 F.3d 1437, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Eastman
Kodak, 114 F.3d 1547, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Voice Technologies Group,
Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Key Pharmaceuticals, 161 F.3d
709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
47

See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co., 114 F.3d at 1555, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1742.
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D. Still More Cases That Apply the Markman Model
Permitting extrinsic evidence into the claim construction inquiry dilutes the
record, which inevitably enlarges the error rate. Vitronics is a perfect example. The trial
court allowed and relied upon extrinsic evidence. The Federal Circuit reached a contrary
claim construction by relying solely on the intrinsic evidence. As evidenced by this
discussion, Vitronics was an unusually easy case--one of the two proffered constructions
produced an implausible or contradictory reading of the patent and was therefore quickly
eliminated by a straightforward reading of the patent. That is the impression one gets
from reading the Federal Circuit’s opinion, yet the case also demonstrates that easy cases
become difficult when an ocean of extrinsic evidence obscures the debate. Vitronics
stands squarely for the proposition that no amount of technical detail will transform a
linguistically implausible interpretation into a plausible one, but what it may do is coax
the trial court in the face of a heap of extrinsic evidence in predictable equipoise (to
overlook an easy solution).
Next, consider Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., which is another post-Markman case.48
Maxwell involved a device for securing together a single pair of shoes. 49 Retail stores
prefer that each pair of shoes be kept together.50 If they become *201 separated, then they
may become undesirable if the customer can’t locate the other member of the pair. For
shoes with laces, this isn’t a problem because a plastic thread can be run through one
eyelet of each shoe and then the two ends of the thread connected.51 For shoes without
eyelets for laces (e.g., woman’s high-heeled pumps), this technique is not operable.52
Consequently, the inventors of the patent-in-suit developed a tab which is placed along
the inside of each shoe, which roughly function like ordinary eyelets in shoes having
laces.53 At the end of each tab is a small eyelet through which a plastic thread can be run,
hence connecting the two shoes.54
The accused tab was actually a part of the shoe’s lining, so the defendant argued
that the claim term “fastening tab” must be separate from the shoe’s lining.55 By contrast,
48

Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

49

Id. at 1101, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002.

50

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002.

51

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002.

52

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002.

53

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002.

54

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002.

55

Id. at 1105, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1005.
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the patent owner argued that the tab could be a part of the shoe’s lining. 56 Consider the
relevant claim language: “[t]ab ... extending vertically upward ... but spaced apart from
the inside surface of the shoe upper.”57 The disputed claim term “shoe upper”
indisputably includes the inner lining; therefore, the claim itself forecloses the plaintiff’s
proffered construction (i.e., the plaintiff argued that the fastening tab can be a part of the
shoe’s lining). Specifically, the claim requires that the tab be spaced apart from the
lining.58 Hence, if it is part of the shoe’s lining, then the portion of the claim just recited
makes no sense; i.e., a tab cannot be both part of the shoe lining and spaced apart from it.
Once again, like Markman, Vitronics, and Modine, Maxwell is soluble solely by a
careful inspection of the claim itself. Indeed, one cannot help but be struck by the
simplicity of these disputes. This is particularly obvious once the focus is redirected
towards the intrinsic record. No doubt such disputes can be made complicated if the
dispute is poorly framed (the disputed claim term is not precisely identified, or the two
proffered constructions are not established), or if the trial court yields to the unfortunate
temptation to open the floodgates and let in the inevitable avalanche of extrinsic evidence
once either party urges some tiny sliver of ambiguity *202 (which is what happened in
Vitronics for instance). The need to avoid complicating what are genuinely simple
disputes, therefore, is perhaps responsible more than anything else for the Federal
Circuit’s militant proscription on extrinsic evidence expressed in Vitronics, and slightly
less so in Markman. Indeed, this proscription is well grounded provided that the claim
construction dispute fits the model just described that is where one of the two proffered
constructions is eliminated on the ground that it renders the text internally incoherent.
In Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., the patent at issue was related to a particular type
of semiconductor device known as a MOSFET (Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect
Transistor), which is used to control the flow of electrical power.59 A thyristor is a similar
device, but it exhibits “latching,” which refers to the fact that the thyristor will turn on
and remain on even after a gate control signal is removed. 60 This latching property arises
from the structure of the thyristor.61 The four alternating semiconductor regions
incorporate two three-layer combinations, each of which has a forward current gain
denoted as α1 and α2.62 According to the standard teaching in the semiconductor art, a
56

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1005.

57

Id. at 1102, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1003.

58

Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1003.

59

Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d 1149, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1018 (Fed. Cir.

60

Id. at 1151, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1019.

61

Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1019.

62

Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020.
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thyristor will not latch if the sum of α1 and α2 is less than one.63
The claim at issue was directed to a MOSFET device; the disputed language was:
“no thyristor action occurs under any device operating conditions.”64 IXYS, the accused
infringer, argued that the disputed language referred only to four-layer devices that,
because of their structure, never acted as thyristors (i.e., in other words, α1 + α2 is always
less than one).65 The patent owner, Harris, predictably argued for a broader construction:
that the MOSFET device can act as a thyristor under certain conditions as long as the
device was intended to be operated below the thyristor threshold.66 Thus, according to the
accused infringer the claim excludes thyristors, and according to the patent owner the
claim can include them.
*203 The Federal Circuit rejected Harris’s broad interpretation and selected the
one urged by IXYS.67 Despite the obvious complexity of the technology, the Court
produced its construction without extrinsic evidence. Indeed, like Modine and the other
cases discussed in this section, the Court reached its construction by eliminating one of
the two proffered constructions; the Court’s reasoning was linguistic rather than
technical. In this instance, the Court observed that Harris’s proffered construction was
difficult to reconcile with the claim language “under any device operating conditions,”
since Harris urged that an accused device could infringe if it exhibited thyristor behavior
under some operating conditions. 68 In straightforward terms, the Court eliminated
Harris’s argument once it identified an obvious linguistic inconsistency: In plain terms,
Harris’s claim construction argument is that the intended “operating conditions” of the
patented device do not include conditions that cause the device to latch, and therefore the
device does not latch under its intended “operating conditions.”69
In summary, the Federal Circuit resolved a claim construction dispute relating to
particularly complex technology without a single glance at extrinsic evidence based
solely on identifying each party’s proffered construction, and then eliminating the one
that produced an incoherent reading of the patent.

63

Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020.

64

Id., 114 F.3d at 1152, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020.

65

Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020.

66

Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020.

67

Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020.

68

Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1021.

69

Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1021.

1 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 191

Copyright © Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

Finally, consider PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries Corp. 70 In this case the
disputed claim term was “SO3.”71 The plaintiff argued that it referred to all sulfur
compounds including iron sulfide. 72 The defendant argued that the term referred only to
dissolved sulfate retained in the glass composition.73 The term was not defined in the
specification. 74 From a distance, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which extrinsic
evidence is less objectionable. Expert testimony seems absolutely crucial to explain how
one skilled in the relevant art would understand the disputed term; indeed, both
candidates seem plausible. In fact, the trial court permitted PPG to introduce expert
testimony on this issue.75 What is interesting *204 though is that the Federal Circuit did
not rely upon extrinsic evidence. Instead, it held based solely on a careful examination of
the specification that the term SO3 must refer only to dissolved sulfates.76 The court
observed that the specification states that “[r]esidual amounts [of SO3] in the glass can
vary and have no significant effect on the properties of the glass product.”77 Yet as both
parties agreed, iron sulfide is a strong colorant in glass; in other words, it can have a
“significant effect” on glass properties. 78 Therefore, “SO3,” whatever it means, cannot
include iron sulfide, since the statement in the specification states that SO3 in small
amounts has no significant effect on glass properties. Following this analysis, the term
“SO3,” if it were to mean all sulfur species including iron sulfide, would render the
specification contradictory since it would refer to SO3 in two different ways (i.e., SO3
cannot both have no significant effect and have a significant effect).79 Therefore, this
construction must be eliminated.80 Also observe that the Federal Circuit never actually
defined the term “SO3” but just decreed that, whatever it meant, it could not refer to all
sulfide species; the plaintiff’s proffered construction was eliminated, therefore resolving
70

PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
71

Id. at 1356, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355.

72

Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355.

73

Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355.

74

Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355.

75

Id. at 1357, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1356.

76

Id. at 1356, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1357.

77

Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355.

78

Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355.

79

Id. at 1357, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1356-57.

80

Id. at 1358, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1357.
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the claim construction issue.81
Remember that claim construction is just a predicate to the ultimate question of
infringement, which is a binary decision; either the accused device infringes or it does
not. The patent owner will urge a construction that will capture the accused device within
the scope of the claims, and of course the accused infringer will offer one that excludes it.
The trial judge correctly performs the claim construction task by selecting one of these.
There is little point in doing more than this; principled construction of a legal document
should mean not seeking more precision or generality than you need for the particular
task at hand. The cases discussed in this section reflect that each case is remarkable in its
emphasis on identifying the implausible interpretation, rather than on comparing the two
to determine the best one, or worse, embarking on an unbounded search for the singular,
correct meaning. For example:
*205 [Maxwell] [T]o accept Maxwell’s claim interpretation that the inside
lining of the shoe is part of the tab, we would have to ignore the claim
limitations that require ....82
[Markman] [T]he claim phrase “detect and localize spurious additions to
inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom” does not make sense
using Markman’s definition of “inventory.”83
[PPG Industries] [A]n interpretation that includes all sulfur compounds
would call into question the accuracy of the statement in the specification
....84
Additionally, if the Federal Circuit wanted its judges to ransack the record in
some sort of cryptographic quest for the singular correct meaning, then it would not have
placed such tight restrictions on the use of extrinsic evidence, as indeed it did in
Markman and Cybor.85 In fact, if one is trying to crack a code, then all interpretive
81

In PPG, the Federal Circuit never admonished the trial court for relying on
extrinsic evidence, probably because the trial court got the right answer, like Markman
but unlike Vitronics; nevertheless, it is very clear that the Federal Circuit did not rely
upon that extrinsic evidence in PPG.
82

Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1105, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1005 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
83

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461(1995).
84

PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1356, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
85

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
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sources should be freely available without restriction, which in this case, they are not.
Therefore, what the cases presented in this section (collected in Table A) demonstrate is
that a routine and indeed preferred technique of claim construction is to check each
proffered construction against the text and eliminate one of the two proffered
constructions that renders the patent internally incoherent. This technique is now firmly
installed in the Federal Circuit claim construction jurisprudence.
Finally, it should come as no surprise that the Federal Circuit’s harsh
proscriptions on extrinsic evidence are found in the cases discussed in this section cases
in which the claim construction dispute is easiest to resolve. More to the point, the
authors of Markman, Vitronics, and most recently, Cybor, appear to *206 believe that
disputes requiring extrinsic evidence occur far too infrequently, if ever, to justify an
exception to claim construction jurisprudence. For instance:
[W]hile credibility determinations theoretically could play a role in claim
construction, the chance of such an occurrence is “doubtful” ....86
[T]he specification is ... usually dispositive ... it is the single best guide to
the meaning of a disputed term.87
In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity
in a disputed claim term. 8889
In this next section, a second category of cases shall be examined. These cases
involve situations where both proffered constructions produce a plausible reading of the
text and are not soluble using the Markman model. One purpose of this examination is to
assess whether the Federal Circuit’s proscriptions on extrinsic evidence are justified.
III. The Multiform model

86

Id. at 1455-56, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1174 (citing Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1469).
87

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
88

Id. at 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1577.

89

Vary or contradict with respect to what? Taken literally, this seems to mean that
extrinsic evidence can only be relied upon to corroborate or to provide meaning when the
intrinsic record is silent or too self-conflicting to reliably converge on a single meaning
(i.e., the intrinsic record, at different parts, supports both proffered constructions). In
other words, Markman and progeny appear to prohibit extrinsic evidence in those
instances in which it would actually be probative.

1 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 191

Copyright © Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

Aside from the Markman family, a second distinct and distinguishable line of
cases has coalesced into at least a tendency and at most a legal standard. Exemplary cases
from this line shall be discussed in detail. Readers can then determine for themselves
whether these cases suggest a discernible pattern, and whether this pattern implies a legal
rule. In this Article, the interpretive strategy *207 applied in this particular family of
Federal Circuit decisions shall be referred to as the “Multiform model.” The cases
discussed in this section are listed in Table B.
The characteristics that define the Multiform model cases exhibit the following
pattern. First, the patent owner urges the dictionary definition (either layman’s or
technical) of the disputed claim term; the accused infringer proffers a narrower
construction, but one subsumed within the dictionary definition. Second, the Court
refuses the ordinary dictionary definition of the term, even though the term is not
expressly defined in the specification, and ultimately selects the narrower of the two
proffered constructions. 90 Third, although both proffered constructions produce a
coherent and plausible reading of the patent--they are not soluble by applying the
Markman model--the Federal Circuit nonetheless resolves the dispute without extrinsic
evidence. In each case comprising this family, the Federal Circuit deliberately avoids
extrinsic evidence even though it is available, is probative, and was relied upon by the
trial court.91 Finally, in each instance, the Court selects the proffered construction in
accordance with the stated objectives or purpose of the invention, and it rejects the

90

Indeed, this trend towards narrower constructions from the Federal Circuit has
been noted by others. See, Patrick J. Flinn and Keith E. Broyles, The Patent Prairie Gets
Fenced In: The Court’s Trend Seems to Be Towards Limiting Patent Claims, NAT’L L.
J., C4, Feb. 8, 1999.
91

One apparent exception is Fromson v. Anitek Printing Plates Inc., 132 F.3d
1437, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1997); however, though extrinsic evidence was
admitted and perhaps relied upon at trial, the Federal Circuit mentioned it only to
corroborate its construction produced solely from the intrinsic record as evidenced by this
remark from the Cybor majority: “In Fromson, the district court ‘relied primarily on the
‘754 specification ....’ [citing, Fromson, 132 F.3d at 1442, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269] Although
the extrinsic record--expert testimony, prior art, and scientific tests--confirmed the district
court’s claim construction, it was directed primarily to whether Anitec’s thin, nonporous
oxide layer infringed the claims.” Cybor Corporation v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138
F.3d 1448, 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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proffered construction inconsistent with those stated objectives. 92
*208 The first of these cases is Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam LTD.93 In
Multiform, the disputed claim term was “degrade” in a claim directed to a device for
controlling spilled liquids.94 The claimed device is a packet that consists of a degradable
envelope which holds an absorbing material and a treating material. 95 This packet can be
placed near a container filled with a hazardous liquid, so that if the liquid spills, it
contacts the envelope, and eventually “degrades” it, hence releasing the absorbing and
treating material, which acts on the spilled liquid.96 In the preferred embodiment of the
invention, the packet envelope is made of a soluble material, which readily dissolves
92

The Federal Circuit has decided several other cases after Markman in which it
applied an interpretive strategy very similar to the Multiform model, though the cases did
not have all of the characteristics that I identified above. See, Bell & Howell Document
Management Prods. Comp. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033, 1038
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (selecting the broader of the two proffered constructions, though
essentially applying the Multiform model, “The specification sets forth that the invention
is an improvement over, inter alia, the paper-ribbed prior art because it does not use a
separate adhesive layer between the ribs and the panels .... [I]t is the main object of this
invention to provide ... a jacket for microfilm wherein the channels are defined by in situ
ribs which are integral with the panels of the jacket ....”); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura
LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1160, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (construing the
term “greater than 3% elasticity,” which obviously had no dictionary definition;
moreover, the two proffered constructions were of approximately equal scope, “[O]ur
interpretation of the claims is consistent with and furthers the purpose of the invention.”);
Novo Nordisk of North America Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 77 F.3d 1364, 1370, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d 1773, 1778 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (deciding the case based upon the Multiform
model, though neither party relied upon the ordinary dictionary definition. Quoting the
applicants’ remarks made during prosecution, the Court stated “the present invention
provides a basis for dispensing with the necessity of an additional processing step. It, for
the first time, provides a convenient method for producing in a host system a protein
which is in mature form, having been expressed directly by means of this invention.”);
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1228
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (selecting the broader of the two proffered constructions but rejecting
the narrower dictionary definition, “We too conclude ... that ‘skinless’ is properly
construed as a performance characteristic ....”).
93

Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, LTD., 133 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
94

Id. at 1475, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1430.

95

Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431.

96

Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431.

1 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 191

Copyright © Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

upon contact with most liquids.97 The absorbing material is preferably sodium
polyacrylate, a known absorbent, which expands and forms a gel on contact with a liquid;
the treating material can be a deodorizer, for instance.98
Medzam, the accused infringer, sold a similar packet, but the envelope was made
of a porous material (like the kind used in teabags).99 This causes the Medzam packet to
work a little differently than Multiform’s preferred embodiment. Hence, when the
Medzam envelope contacts a spilled liquid, the absorbing material inside the envelope
expands and bursts the envelope (rather than dissolves as in the Multiform envelope),
releasing the entire contents for further absorbing and *209 treatment.100 Medzam argued
that the mode of releasing the envelope contents--i.e., bursting--was excluded from the
meaning of the claim term “degradable.”101 This term, it argued, referred to dissolution,
as evidenced by the embodiments recited in Multiform’s specification.102
Multiform’s rejoinder was very simple. It urged that the ordinary layman’s
dictionary definition of the term “degradable” must control, absent an express definition
in the specification to the contrary (there was none).103 Therefore, Medzam argued, the
term had its ordinary meaning, which was: “[a]ny loss in containment function of the
envelope.”104 So, Medzam’s proffered construction was not repugnant to Multiform’s,
indeed, it was a narrower definition, subsumed within it. In addition, both interpretation
produced a coherent reading of the specification.
97

Id. at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1432.

98

Id. at 1475, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431.

99

Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431.

100

Id. at 1476, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431.

101

Id. at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431.

102

Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431.

103

See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[W]ords in a claim are generally given their
ordinary and customary meaning ....”); see also, York Products., Inc. v. Central Tractor
Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1619, 1622 (Fed.Cir.1996)
(“Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim
terms take on their ordinary meaning.”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.,
78 F.3d 1575, 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1126, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A technical term used
in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by
persons experienced in the field of the invention ....”).
104

Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, LTD., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45
U.S.P.Q.2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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The trial court refused to assign the ordinary dictionary meaning to the disputed
term, and agreed with Medzam. 105 It defined the term “degradable” more narrowly that
its general dictionary definition, “[i]n light of the mode of action of the accused device
....”106 The Federal Circuit agreed.107 To reach this construction, the trial court (and
Federal Circuit) relied only upon the intrinsic evidence and almost exclusively upon the
specification. 108 Thus, in Multiform, the patent owner urged the ordinary dictionary
definition of the disputed language; the *210 Federal Circuit refused it, and without
relying on extrinsic evidence, selected a narrower construction based explicitly on the
stated objectives of the invention.
Next, consider O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co.109 In O.I. Corp., the disputed claim term
was “passage” in a claim directed to a device for removing water vapor from a sample
prior to analysis by gas chromatography. 110 In the preferred embodiment of the invention,
the passage (the interior of the tube) is threaded rather than smooth.111 The reason for the
threading is to induce a swirling motion of the sample, which promotes removal of the
water from the sample. 112
The Tekmar device fits this description, but the internal walls of the tube are
smooth rather than threaded.113 Predictably, Tekmar argued that the term “passage”
referred to a threaded (or similar configuration) but not to a smooth internal
configuration. 114 The patent owner, O.I. Corp. argued that the disputed term “passage”
had its ordinary dictionary meaning. 115 The trial court again rejected the dictionary
105

Id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433.

106

Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433.

107

Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433.

108

Mezdam highlighted a portion of the prosecution history favorable to its
position, which was recited in the Federal Circuit’s opinion; this evidence was very weak.
109

O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1777 (Fed. Cir.

1997).
110

Id. at 1580, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1779.

111

Id. at 1581, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1780.

112

Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1780.

113

Id. at 1582, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1781.

114

Id. at 1580, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1779.

115

O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d at 1580, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1779.
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meaning and selected the narrower meaning urged by the accused infringer. 116 To do that,
it relied primarily upon a portion of the patent specification in which the inventors recited
the advantages of the invention. As with the threaded or ridged configuration, the conical
shape causes a swirling effect on the water vapor from the analyte slug. [I]n contrast, the
prior art has generally specified that the pneumatic tubing and passageways between the
trap and GC are smooth-walled.”117 Just like in Multiform, the O.I. Corp. panel, without
relying on extrinsic evidence, rejected the broader dictionary definition and adopted a
narrower subset of that meaning, based solely upon the portion of the specification that
recites the purpose of the invention.
Similarly in Mantech v. Hudson, the disputed claim term was “well” in a claim
directed to monitoring the movement and levels of groundwater *211 contamination.118
The patent owner, Mantech, argued that the term “well” had its ordinary dictionary
meaning (modified slightly for this context), which was “a device that provides access to
groundwater.”119 Neither parties’ expert disputed this general meaning of the term.120
Hudson argued that as the term was used in the context of the patent, it referred to a
structure that enabled either monitoring the groundwater or injecting substances into the
groundwater.121 The Federal Circuit accepted this construction.122 As in Multiform and
O.I. Corp., the Mantech panel rejected the dictionary definition and adopted a
construction subsumed within, but not inconsistent with, that broader meaning. It
developed that construction by a careful examination of the patent specification to
determine the invention’s purpose.
In addition to the three cases discussed in this section, many more cases in which
the Federal Circuit has applied the Multiform model after Markman are described in
pertinent part in Table B. One should also be aware that though each case that I discuss in
this section was decided after Markman, the Multiform model has an established
pedigree. Numerous panels have relied upon this Model to decide pre-Markman

116

Id. at 1581, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1779.

117

Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1780-81.

118

Mantech Environmental Corp. v. Hudson Envtl. Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1368,
47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1732 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
119

Id. at 1370, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1734.

120

Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1734.

121

Id. at 1372, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1734.

122

Id. at 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1738.
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disputes.123
*212 Again, one remarkable feature of the Multiform model cases is that they are
decided without extrinsic evidence. In each of these cases, the patent owner argued that
the disputed term’s meaning was coextensive with its ordinary or technical dictionary
definition. The accused infringer argued that it was narrower--not repugnant to or outside
of that definition--but subsumed within it. The significance of this is that the term’s
general meaning to the PHOSITA--i.e., its “fixed meaning”--was not in dispute. The
debate was conducted entirely within a single, agreed-upon lexical plane. What was in
dispute was how the term was used in the text. The key distinction here is between intraand extra-textual conflicts. So Multiform, and cases like it, stand for the proposition that
arguments that narrowly focus upon how a term is used in a patent are best resolved by
an examination of the patent itself.
If the Multiform model is an emerging trend in Federal Circuit claim construction
jurisprudence, then there should be reasons for it, and indeed there are: First, the
123

See, e.g., Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
1936, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (construing the term “straw shaped” whether it requires
hollowness or not: “Although the documentation does not expressly identify the
hollowness characteristic as contributing to the inventive concept, it is not inconsistent
with that concept either. Moreover, a significant and possibly critical contribution for this
feature can be readily inferred: it permits the release of steam before the elements are
burned away ....”); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc., 15 F.3d
1573, 1578, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (construing the term “spaced
apart” whether it requires that the surfaces be spaced apart over their entire surface area:
“Were the claimed invention to have intersecting beam surfaces, in those areas where the
beams intersected the invention would be unable to achieve its stated objectives of
distinguishing valid inputs from stray inputs caused by small foreign objects or
determining the velocity of an object approaching the touch panel.”); The Read Corp. v.
Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 823, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1426, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (construing
the term “closed to the ground” on whether the object must actually touch the ground:
“The prosecution history describes the short end’s function of acting as a barrier ....
[T]hus the specification indicates an “end closed to the ground” means sufficiently closed
to achieve those functions.”); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d 1601, 1604-05 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (construing the term “plasticizer” whether it
refers to just external or both internal and external plasticizers: “Nowhere does the
specification of the ‘487 patent teach that external plasticizers must be used. On the
contrary, some internally plasticized polymers are expressly disclosed in the
specification. The emphasis is on the suitability of any plasticizer that will achieve the
specified properties, not on the particular class of plasticizer.”); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v.
Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 450, 230 U.S.P.Q. 416, 421 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (construing the term ‘smooth,’ “[w]e hold that smooth means smooth enough to
serve the inventor’s purposes, i.e., not to inflame or irritate the eyelid of the wearer or be
perceived by him at all when in place.”).
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Multiform model may reflect the Federal Circuit’s growing impatience with poor claim
drafting--either deliberate or inadvertent-- as well as with patent owners who during
litigation, urge for constructions that are far broader than either the inventor or draftsman
ever dreamed possible. This view is evidenced in more than a few recent Federal Circuit
decisions. For instance, consider these remarks from Judge Clevenger in Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.:
Here, too, we have expended significant effort endeavoring to ascertain the proper
construction of the term “pusher assembly” in claim 24. As has already been noted, the
‘519 specification provides minimal guidance on this question. Similarly, as U.S.
Surgical points out, the Tompkins’ specification which originated the term is of little, if
any, help. Without more explicit alternatives, we have been forced to spend a significant
quantity of time carefully sifting through each piece of the reissue prosecution history
made part of *213 the appellate record in an effort to discover the term’s proper
meaning.124

Similarly, Judge Nichols has also expressed the Federal Circuit’s obvious sense of
frustration: “We are up against what we must realistically consider a growing inability of
speakers and writers, lawyers, technicians, and laymen, to say what they intend to say
with accuracy and clarity.”125
Second, the Multiform model appears to be a deliberate, coherent strategy to
adhere to Markman’s primary mandate. Again, a defining characteristic of the Multiform
model cases is that they are resolved without extrinsic evidence even though both
proffered constructions are plausible; they are genuinely close cases. Markman also
insists that the trial court’s construction preserve the text’s internal coherence. Clearly,
the Multiform model executes both of those directives. These cases produce claim
constructions without extrinsic evidence, and do so by eliminating proffered
constructions that are inconsistent with the purpose or stated objectives of the invention.
A third possible reason for the emergence of the Multiform model is compromise.
The interpretive strategy distilled from the Multiform model cases appears to be a
compromise strategy between the two competing factions within the Federal Circuit

124

Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572,
1581, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1019, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
125

ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1583, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Nichols, J., dissenting).
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strategy for resolving difficult cases.126 In September of 1995, the *214 Federal Circuit
126

The post-Markman Court does not always rely upon the Multiform model-even in those instances when it is applicable--in fact, on two occasions it has rejected it
outright. See, York Products, Inc. v. Central Tractor, 99 F.3d 1568, 1573, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the phrase “a substantial part of the entire height
thereof” [in a claim directed to a protective liner for a pickup truck bed] to determine to
how much of the height the ridge members must extend; the plaintiff urged that the term
means only “[a]mple extension to accomplish the purposes of locking loads.” Judge
Rader, writing for the majority, rejected this interpretation: “The language and syntax of
the claim preclude a functional definition of ‘substantial part.”’ Later he said: “This
redraft [urged by the plaintiff] would essentially strip many words in the claim of their
meaning.”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1579, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the term “dimension,” which
either referred to linear measure [i.e., the resin beads shrunk by no more than 50% of
their size based on diameter] or volume [the resin beads shrunk by no more than 50% of
their size based on volume]. That the disputed term referred to volume was supported by
reference to the objectives of the invention specification. For example, according to
Hoechst’s expert: “[I]t is clearly the objective of this patent to distinguish between a resin
that works because it has a porosity independent of swelling ... and another type of resin
that depends upon swelling.” Judge Newman, writing for the majority, rejected this
construction, primarily on the ground that if the functional definition were selected, then
the major independent claim would exclude the preferred embodiment. The canon that
interpretations that place the preferred embodiment outside the scope of the claim are to
be avoided, is perhaps the strongest canon in patent law.); See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (An
interpretation of a patent’s claims that would exclude from their scope “a preferred [and
indeed only] embodiment ... is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive
evidentiary support ....”); See also, e.g., Hoechst Celanese, 78 F.3d at 158, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
1126, 1130 (“[I]t is unlikely that an inventor would define the invention in a way that
excluded the preferred embodiment, or that persons of skill in this field would read the
specification in such a way.”); I am aware of only one case in which this canon has been
violated: Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In both York Products and Hoechst, the plaintiff’s proffered
construction was rejected as in the Multiform model cases. Moreover, in York Products,
the plaintiff’s interpretation would have read words out of the claim, while in Hoechst,
the plaintiff’s construction would have violated the strong canon discussed above. Finally
in J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., the majority adopted a construction of
the term “plastic flow temperature above 120°” in an invention directed to a vermin trap
comprised of a flat surface coated with a pressure-sensitive adhesive. The disputed
focused upon how parameter referred to in the claim term was measured. The majority
(Judges Clevenger and Rich) concluded that a plastic flow temperature above 120° meant
that the adhesive on the sheet must resist flow when exposed for 24 hours at a
temperature of 120° and when the sheet is suspended in both horizontal and vertical
(upside down) orientations. Judge Rader disagreed (i.e., his dissent actually applied the
Multiform model). Thus, he relied upon portions of the intrinsic record showing that the
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decided Markman, en banc. Of the twelve sitting judges, eight joined the majority
opinion (written by then-Chief Judge Archer, who also authored the majority opinion in
Cybor). Judges Mayer and Rader each filed concurring opinions; and Judge Newman
filed a 27-page dissent. Markman did not provide a uniform standard for claim
construction, so the Federal Circuit less than three years later decided to hear the matter
again en banc, this time in Cybor v. FAS Technologies. Cybor did little to assure the
patent bar that the Federal Circuit would apply a consistent claim construction standard
from one panel to the next, as *215 evidenced by the voting alignment in Cybor.127 Of the
12 judges who heard the case, five judges either wrote separately or joined a concurring
opinion.128
Subsequently, two disparate factions have emerged with respect to appellate
deference to extrinsic evidentiary findings made at the trial level: Judges Mayer,
Newman, Rader, Plager, and Bryson in one group; and Judges Rich, Gajarsa, Michel,
Lourie, Clevenger, Shall, and Archer in the other.129 Notice the authorship of the twelve
Multiform model cases recited in Table A. Six of the majority opinions were written by
judges from one faction, and six from the other.
So will the Markman model work in every case? No. That the Markman model is
not applicable in some instances is not, however, a fair argument against its use. Besides,
the Multiform model is a second filter in the event that the Markman model is
invention was directed to solving the problem of conventional traps whose adhesive
melted (hence flowed) during shipping. The inventors learned that the maximum ambient
temperature encountered during shipping was 120°; this temperature was typically
maintained for about 16 hours (at most), which corresponded to a normal day minus eight
non-daylight hours (hence cooler temperatures). Hence, Judge Rader argued, 16 not 24
hours was a far more relevant index to measure resistance to flow at 120°, since at this
temperature an embodiment of the invention (or an accused device) would perform the
stated objectives or purpose of the invention. 106 F.3d 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641.
127

To be fair, Markman and Cybor are directed at slightly different issues, though
with substantial overlap. In Markman, the primary issue was whether claim construction
was a judge or jury question. In Cybor, the issue was the proper standard of review in
claim construction disputes, or more precisely, the proper degree of deference owned to
the trial court’s factual findings (extrinsic evidence) in the context of a claim construction
disputed. Hence though this issue was decided in Markman--i.e., Markman decreed a de
novo standard of review for claim construction disputes--it was not actually the center of
the dispute, as it was in Cybor.
128

Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169 (Fed.

Cir. 1998).
129

Judge Archer took senior status between the time that Markman and Cybor
were decided en banc. Nevertheless, the Author has included him here, because he was
the author of both majority en banc opinions.
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inapplicable. Indeed, the Federal Circuit frankly acknowledging that not every claim
construction dispute is the same, and then applying the correct precedent (interpretive
strategy) to resolve the dispute, would go a long way towards achieving the stability in
this area of law. The Federal Circuit, the patent bar, and its clients, so desperately need
this stability.
IV. Distinguishing Legal from Interpretive Matters
The Multiform model cases are more difficult to resolve than Markman model
cases. Are there cases in which neither model is applicable? Is extrinsic evidence
necessary to resolve those disputes?
*216 First, consider Athletic Alternatives Inc. v. Prince Mfg. Inc..130 In this
dispute, the patent at issue was directed to a novel tennis racket, or more precisely to the
tennis racket’s arrangement of strings on the racket face. 131 In an ordinary string pattern,
the string holes all lie along a single plane all the way around the racket face. The patent
owner AAI discovered that if the strings are “splayed”--i.e., if the string holes are
arranged alternatively above and below a central plane--then the racket’s user can impart
greater spin on the ball. 132 One key parameter in this regard is the “offset distance” or the
distance between a string hole and a central plane.133 Also important is the number of
offset distances, which is the number of different distances that the offset holes varied
from the central plane. 134 Defendant Prince’s racket had only two offset distances.135 The
claim-in-suit required that the offset distance “varies between” minimum and maximum
values.136 Prince argued that this referred to at least three offset distances (i.e., baseline
value, minimum, and maximum).137 According to the patent owner, AAI, this language

130

Athletic Alternatives Inc. v. Prince Mfg. Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
1365 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
131

Id. at 1576, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369.

132

To visualize this plane, imagine cutting a tennis racket lengthwise into two
identical halves, so that two mirror-image pieces result. A prior art tennis racket has all of
its string holes lying along that axis; the AAI racket has some holes that lie above that
axis, and some below it.
133

Athletic Alternatives Inc., 73 F.3d at 1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1367.

134

Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369.

135

Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369.

136

Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369.

137

Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.
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covered two offset distances as well as three or more.138
The claims themselves provided no clues. The specification was also silent with
respect to whether only two offset distances yields an operable embodiment of the
invention, or whether it is included within the scope of the claims. 139 The prosecution
history was a confusing mass of contradictory and irreconcilable remarks. 140 This dispute
was truly in equipoise, which the Federal Circuit frankly conceded: “[T]he dispositive
claim language on its face is susceptible to two *217 equally plausible meanings ....”141
What the Court did next was interesting. Judge Michel, writing for the majority, invoked
section 112, paragraph 2 of the Patent Code, which states that the “[s]pecification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Although statutory requirements of validity are routinely invoked as interpretive
tools, section 112, paragraph 2 had not been invoked to solve claim construction
problems, prior to AAI.142 From § 112, ¶ 2, Judge Michel extracted a notice requirement:
Were we to allow AAI successfully to assert the broader of the two senses of
“between” against Prince, we would undermine the fair notice function of the
requirement that the patentee distinctly claim the subject matter disclosed in the patent
from which he can exclude others temporarily. Where there is an equal choice between
a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that
indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning,
we consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower

138

Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372.

139

Id., 73 F.3d at 1579, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371.

140

Id. at 1580, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371.

141

Id. at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.

142

See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564,
31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“An appropriate method for resolving [a
claim construction dispute] is to avoid those definitions upon which the PTO could not
reasonably have relied when it issued the patent.”); Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d
1149, 1153, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1018, 1021 (“[C]laims should be read in a way that avoids
ensnaring prior art if it is possible to do so.”); Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1257, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(citing ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221
U.S.P.Q. 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (“Ambiguous claims, whenever possible, should be
construed so as to preserve their validity.”); but see, Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries,
Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1936, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It would not be
appropriate for us now to interpret the claim differently just to cure a drafting error ....”).
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meaning.143

*218 AAI nicely illustrates the distinction between finding meaning and
determining claim scope. The latter is a purely legal exercise, which asks not what the
term means, but what the patent owner is entitled to claim. AAI also demonstrates that
many claim construction disputes are not soluble on linguistic grounds. Often the
disputed claim term will credibly support both proffered constructions, as we have seen
in the Multiform model cases. However in AAI--unlike the Multiform model cases--both
proffered constructions were consonant with the invention’s purpose. A statutory
requirement of patentability was invoked to place principled constraints upon the possible
spectrum of meaning. Like the Multiform model, this approach undoubtedly evolved in
response to Markman. It is directed to panels to identify and apply disciplined
interpretive techniques to resolve difficult claim construction disputes without the use of
extrinsic evidence and that preserve the internal coherence of the text.
In fact, AAI appears to be the seed of an emerging trend as evidenced by the fact
that it has been closely followed in three recent Federal Circuit decisions. In addition, the
AAI approach has been applied by judges on both sides of the Markman/Cybor debate.
Likewise in Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. the Federal Circuit refused
to extend the scope of meaning of the disputed claim term, reasoning that “[t]o the extent
that the claim is ambiguous, a narrower reading which excludes the ambiguously covered
subject matter must be adopted.”144

143

See AAI at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372 (Judge Michel said in the same
opinion “[t]he primary purpose of the requirement [section 112, paragraph 2] is ‘to guard
against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from
uncertainty as to their respective rights.”’) (citing, General Electric Co. v. Wabash
Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369, 37 U.S.P.Q.466 (1938)); see also, McClain v.
Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The object of the patent law in requiring the
patentee [to distinctly claim his invention] is not only to secure to him all to which he is
entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them.”); Rengo Co. v. Molins
Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551, 211 U.S.P.Q. 303, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1891) (other citations
omitted).
144

See Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1581, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1019, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing AAI, F.3d at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1372); See also, Genentech Inc. v. The Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 156465, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (this is a pre-Markman case similar to AAI
and Ethicon: “[W]e are unwilling to say that the specification satisfies the enablement
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (1988) with respect to these broader definitions, or
that the PTO could have relied on these definitions in issuing the patent.”) (citations
omitted).
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More recently, AAI was closely followed in Digital Biometrics.145 There, the
disputed claim term was “array” in a claim directed to a system of generating a
computerized image of a human fingerprint.146 The accused infringer’s system was
virtually identical to Digital Biometrics’ except that the former system relied upon an
array that did not store data in a digital format or in the memory. 147 Naturally *219 this
difference formed the basis for the claim construction dispute. Though Digital
Biometrics’ preferred embodiments showed an array storing the data in memory and in
digital format, it nevertheless argued that since the term “array” was not expressly
defined anywhere in the patent specification, its “ordinary” meaning was controlling. 148
They proffered a meaning straight from the standard technical dictionary in the field.149
This definition was sufficiently broad to cover data not stored in digital format or in
memory.
The panel rejected this argument.150 What is interesting is how Judge Plager,
writing for the majority, justified the result. First, he found support for Identix’ (the
accused infringer’s) narrower interpretation in the specification--though this is of
questionable relevance since Digital Biometrics could have relied upon the venerable
canon that preferred embodiments do not define the scope of the invention--by holding
that limitations in the specification should not be imported into the claims. 151 This
provided the basis for ultimately rejecting Digital Biometrics’ broader construction in
favor of the narrower one, reasoning that, between the two, the narrower one more
adequately complied with section 112, paragraph 1. Granted, this argument is always
available in favor of the narrower construction; nevertheless, Judge Plager took the
unusual (and very sophisticated) step of illustrating the questionable validity (on section
112, paragraph 1 grounds) of Digital Biometrics’ interpretation. By constructing a
hypothetical claim based on that interpretation and analyzing the validity of that claim on
section 112, paragraph 1 grounds, the Court found:

145

Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1418
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
146

Id. at 1343, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1424.

147

Id. at 1342, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1423.

148

Id. at 1346, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426.

149

Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426.

150

Id. at 1348, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426.

151

See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 231
U.S.P.Q. 185 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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In view of the uncertainties surrounding the implementation of such an invention
[described the hypothetical claim based on the patent’s owner’s proffered construction],
we adopt the narrow claim construction that is clearly supported by the written
description, and interpret “array” in claim 16 to mean a data structure stored in memory
that is representative of a two-dimensional image.152

*220 The AAI model was recently extended in Brand Management.153 There, the
disputed claim term was “sides” in a claim directed to a construction device for
connecting building elements (e.g., 2x2 planks) used to build decks. 154 Plaintiff Brand
Management argued that “sides” referred to just the internal sides; the accused infringer
argued that it referred to both internal and external sides. 155 The Brand Management
panel selected the narrower of the two proffered constructions once again, closely
following the AAI decision: The term “sides” is ambiguous to the extent that it could be
interpreted to refer to either internal sides or both internal and external sides. [F]aced
with two competing interpretations that are equally tenable, we choose to reinforce the
notice requirement by construing claim 1 narrowly.156
The AAI family of cases compels the question whether the Federal Circuit intends
for trial courts to apply this model before or after it allows extrinsic evidence. In other
words, must the trial court invoke the AAI model immediately after exhausting the
intrinsic record? Or is it first permitted to admit extrinsic evidence? If that provides no
solution, then can the Court invoke the AAI technique? The answer to this question is
important because the AAI model is applicable in every single claim construction dispute.
In AAI itself, the court mentioned that no extrinsic evidence was available. Similarly, the
authority following AAI did not provide an answer. For instance, from the Digital
Biometrics panel:
[I]f after consideration of the intrinsic evidence there remains doubt as to the exact
meaning of the claim terms, consideration of extrinsic evidence may be necessary to
determine the proper construction. If a claim falls into this latter category, however,
another claim construction canon comes into play. Because the applicant has the burden
to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention,” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (1994), if the claim is susceptible to a
broader and a narrower meaning, and the narrower one is clearly supported by the
intrinsic evidence while the broader one *221 raises questions of enablement under §

152

Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1346, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
1418, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing AAI, 73 F.3d at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372).
153

Brand Management, Inc. v. Sutherland Lumber Southwest Inc., 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15255 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
154

Id. at *5.

155

Id.

156

Id. at *8 (quoting AAI, 73 F.3d at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372).
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112, ¶ 1, we will adopt the narrower of the two.157

Whether a trial court can allow extrinsic evidence prior to invoking the AAI model
deserves resolution by the Federal Circuit.
If extrinsic evidence was ever justified to resolve a claim construction dispute,
then AAI, Digital Biometrics, and Brand Management are striking exemplars. 158 It is hard
to imagine three cases in which the meaning of the disputed claim term was more in
equipoise, and yet the Federal Circuit still did not rely on extrinsic evidence to resolve
them.
If Digital Biometrics and Brand Management are reliable indicators, then the
interpretive strategy decreed in AAI has become securely embedded in the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence.159 Indeed, unlike the Markman and Multiform
models, the AAI line of authority can be invoked to solve any claim construction dispute.
Therefore, the principle established in AAI must be cautiously applied. The purpose of the
discussion that follows is to suggest the limits of this principle.
Contrast AAI with Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp.160 There, the disputed
claim term was “plasticizer,” a term of art in polymer chemistry.161 Plasticizers come in
two types: internal and external. 162 Neither the term “internal” nor “external” is used in
the patent specification. 163 The patent discloses species of plasticizers that are all external
plasticizers (but without using the term “external”) as the preferred embodiments.164
Several species of internal plasticizers are obliquely mentioned, though not
emphasized.165 The patent owner *222 argued that “plasticizer” referred to both internal
157

Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
158

Collected in Table C.

159

The Author is aware of only one case in which the Federal Circuit has cited
and refused to apply the AAI approach: Transco Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contracting,
Inc., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21294 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
160

Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1601 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
161

Id. at 986, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604.

162

Id. at 985, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1603.

163

Id. at 987, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604.

164

Id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604.

165

Id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604.
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and external plasticizers. 166 The accused infringer urged that the term referred to only
external plasticizers.167 If Specialty Composites followed AAI, then it would have invoked
section 112, paragraph 2 and reasoned that the inventor did not adequately disclosed both
types of plasticizers, and therefore the term shall be construed to satisfy section 112,
paragraph 2’s implicit notice requirement. Yet the Specialty Composites panel decided
the case the other way.168 Hence, despite the limited disclosure, the claim term
“plasticizer” covers both internal and external plasticizers according to the Court.169 Are
AAI and Specialty Composites reconcilable?
Perhaps they are. The focus in AAI was upon the patent’s disclosure--i.e., was a
racket having two splay patterns adequately disclosed in the specification? Again, the
Court said no. Recall that one can satisfy section 112’s strictures in either of two ways: 1)
through express disclosure in the specification; or 2) by relying upon the PHOSITA to
furnish the teaching (i.e., under established Federal Circuit law, a patent specification
incorporates by reference all that is well-known in the art to which the patent is directed,
and so therefore the patent need not include that “background” information, and indeed
preferably omits it).170 Therefore, an implicit indifference curve is at work: the closer the
particular element is to the invention’s center of gravity, the greater the disclosure
requirement. Put another way, if the particular claim element in dispute is a novel feature
of the invention--i.e., if the invention, or part of it, resides in that element--then the
PHOSITA will have no knowledge of it, since it is by definition “novel,” and therefore
not a well-known principle in the art. Therefore, the inventor must disclose it in the
patent specification with particularity. This is precisely the scenario in AAI. The splay
pattern was the heart of the invention, offset string holes in a tennis racket was the
invention. The PHOSITA could not be expected to know whether a racket having only
two offset distances would result in a functional embodiment of the invention. More
precisely, the PHOSITA was unable to furnish that knowledge (if he was, then the of
course, invention would fail for lack of novelty). Therefore, since AAI’s specification did
not furnish that teaching, then it was unavailable to the *223 PHOSITA.171 The narrower
construction was selected to preserve the patent’s validity on the grounds of section 112,
166

Id. at 986, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604.

167

Id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604.

168

Id. at 993, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1609.

169

Id. at 988, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1606.

170

See, e.g., Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys., 804 F.2d
659, 231 U.S.P.Q. 649 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,
802 F.2d 1367, 231 U.S.P.Q. 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also, In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660,
661, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[U]nless the information is well known
in the art, the application itself must contain this information ....”).
171

That is, claims directed to those particular embodiments were not enabled.
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paragraphs 1,2 grounds.
Now contrast AAI with Specialty Composites where the invention was for foam
rubber earplugs. The advantage of the invention lay in the earplugs’ compressibility,
which allowed them to be squeezed between the thumb and forefinger and inserted into
the ear canal, and their plasticity, which allowed them to return to original size so that
they formed a reasonably tight seal around the ear canal (yet were easy to insert). In order
to achieve the desired compressibility and plasticity, a “plasticizer” had to be added to the
foam to permit it to be compressed, yet still have a sufficiently high rate of recovery to
fill the ear canal. The Federal Circuit quite correctly believed that the choice of
plasticizer type--internal or external--was of little consequence to the invention:
The emphasis is on the suitability of any plasticizer that will achieve the specified
properties, not on the particular class of plasticizer. [T]he specification states: “Any
flexible polymeric material which can be foamed so as to result in an ultimately formed
earplug structure meeting the recovery rate and pressure criteria set forth herein above
constitutes a satisfactory material of construction in the earplug of the invention.172

What is quite clear from this passage is that the panel did not believe that the type
of plasticizer was a crucial aspect of the invention because the inventor said that it was
not, which is credible since it is like an admission against interest. Therefore, if it was not
a novel feature of the invention, but rather an ancillary feature of an overall device of
which the invention was also a part, then the PHOSITA could be invoked to furnish the
requisite knowledge to fully practice the invention (i.e. to choose between internal and
external plasticizers).
With these thoughts in mind, the patent owner in AAI was not permitted to rely
upon generally known principles of the relevant art because such principles relating to the
element in disputes did not exist (indeed if he purported to have invented them). On the
other hand, the patent owner in Specialty Composites was allowed to rely upon the
routine implicit teachings of the relevant art to complete the patent disclosure. In other
words, the term “plasticizer” subsumes external and *224 internal plasticizers because the
PHOSITA says it does and would know that either would yield an operable embodiment
of the invention.
The point of this section is only to illustrate the boundaries of the principles set
forth in AAI. AAI should not be relied upon to narrow a claim term in those instances in
which established principles of the relevant technical discipline are available to
supplement the term’s meaning beyond the meaning supplied in the patent specification.
These instances occur when the element in dispute is generally at the invention’s
periphery, rather than at its hub, where the PHOSITA’s knowledge (in theory) falls to
zero.
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Specialty Composites, 845 F.2d 981, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1601.
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Conclusion
Now the relationship between the three families of cases--the Markman model
cases, the Multiform model cases, and the AAI model cases--is understood. In the
Markman-type disputes, linguistic implausibility provides the solution. If both proffered
constructions traverse this minimal hurdle, then it becomes irrelevant, and so a
subsequent filter must be applied. In the Multiform model cases, the ordinary dictionary
meaning is rejected in favor of a subset of that broader meaning, narrowed according to
its use in the context of the patent, and on the ground that the narrower definition is more
consistent with the stated objectives of the invention, or that the rejected interpretation is
inconsistent with those objectives. Like the Markman model, the Multiform model
generates its construction from the intrinsic record alone. In the AAI model cases, both
proffered constructions are linguistically plausible, and both are roughly consistent with
the purpose of the invention. Hence, between two equally plausible interpretations, the
narrower one is selected by invoking a statutory ground of validity namely section 112.
What the prior discussion should at least illustrate is that not all claim
construction disputes are alike. Different types of disputes have created different lines of
authority; this heterogeneity should be accounted for in deciding claim construction
cases. Three distinct lines of authority are chiseled from the block of the Federal Circuit’s
post-Markman precedent, which are now securely installed in the Federal Circuit’s
interpretive repertoire. Indeed, step-wise application of these three successive filters,
beginning with the Markman model to resolve the easiest cases first, and ending with the
AAI model in the most difficult cases--which resist *225 solution by the Markman and
Multiform models--actually defines the Federal Circuit’s claim construction approach in
the post-Markman era.173
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Application of this three-part algorithm to resolve claim construction disputes
is a very good way for trial courts to avoid reversal.
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